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Abstract
We investigate cortical learning from the perspective of mechanism design. First, we show that
discretizing standard models of neurons and synaptic plasticity leads to rational agents maximizing
simple scoring rules. Second, our main result is that the scoring rules are proper, implying that neurons
faithfully encode expected utilities in their synaptic weights and encode high-scoring outcomes in their
spikes. Third, with this foundation in hand, we propose a biologically plausible mechanism whereby
neurons backpropagate incentives which allows them to optimize their usefulness to the rest of cortex.
Finally, experiments show that networks that backpropagate incentives can learn simple tasks.
Keywords: incentives for cooperation, multiagent learning, biologically-inspired approaches,
prediction markets
1. Introduction
How does the brain encode information about the environment into its structure [26]? Inspired by
recent work in prediction markets, this paper investigates cortical learning and the neural code from
the perspective of mechanism design [15, 18, 2, 3, 1]. To the best of our knowledge it is the first paper
to do so.
We start in §2 by modeling neurons as rational agents: that is, agents whose sole aim is to maximize
the expected value of an objective function. To do so, we draw on a recent paper showing that
discretizing standard models of neuronal dynamics [14] and learning [25] yields a threshold neuron
with an online update rule that optimizes a simple objective [5]. By maximizing their objective
function, neurons seek to optimally trade off rewards, depending on neuromodulatory signals such as
dopamine, with costs, depending on resources expended on synaptic connections [6, 7].
However, it is not enough that neurons optimize locally. They should collectively converge on
useful outcomes. The problem of how a global (cortical) optimization procedure can be implemented
at a local (neuronal) level remains open.
To tackle the problem we turn to mechanism design: How to incentivize populations of rational
agents to produce desirable outcomes?
An inspiring successful application of mechanism design is prediction markets, which aggregate the
behavior of self-interested traders into accurate predictions of diverse real-world events [8, 20]. This
has motivated research on payment schemes that encourage agents to trade in markets if the price
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distribution differs from their beliefs [15]. Of particular interest are proper scoring rules: payment
schemes that incentivize rational agents to truthfully report their beliefs [18].
Our next step, §3, is therefore to analyze neuronal objective functions as payment schemes. This
has implications in two directions. First, since the neuronal objective function decomposes as a sum
over synapses, we model synapses as rational agents trading in a neuronal market, §3.1. Second, we
model neurons as rational agents trading in a cortical prediction market, §4.3.
Our main result, Theorem 5, establishes a striking connection between prediction markets and
cortical learning: neuronal objective functions are proper scoring rules. The remainder of the paper
applies two corollaries of Theorem 5 to show that well-functioning neuronal markets form a foundation
for a well-functioning cortical market – thereby gluing together the two perspectives.
Corollary 6 shows that synaptic weights encode the utility expected after pre- and post- synaptic
spikes. This partially answers the question posed earlier: “How does the brain encode information
about the environment into its structure?”
More importantly, the corollary provides a foundation for cooperative learning. Consider the
following basic schema to incentivize rational agents to collaborate:
(i) each agent estimates its usefulness to other agents,
(ii) incorporates the estimate into its reward function and
(iii) thus maximizes its usefulness to the collective.
To implement the schema, neurons must estimate their usefulness. Corollary 6 implies that synaptic
weight wij quantifies how useful spikes from ni are to nj , when nj spikes. More generally, the sum of
outgoing synaptic connections quantifies how useful a neuron’s outputs are to the rest of the system.
We therefore define the usefulness of a neuron as, roughly, the sum of its downstream weights, §4.
In line with the schema we then show, Corollary 7, that incorporating feedback into reward func-
tions causes neurons to (i) estimate their usefulness and (ii) maximize the estimate. This provides
a new interpretation of a spike-based backpropagation scheme [22] that is closely related to error-
backpropagation [23].
In short, well-functioning neuronal markets, with synapses faithfully reporting expected utilities,
can be used to build well-functioning cortical markets.
Finally, experiments in §5 confirm our theoretical results.
Scope and related work. A well-studied framework in neuroscience is based on the idea that neurons
infer the probabilities of external events, which are encoded into probabilistic population codes, see
e.g. [9]. By contrast, we emphasize decisions over inferences. We are concerned with how neurons act,
rather than what they infer. The two perspectives are related and it may turn out, as in prediction
markets where prices can encode probabilities, that the population coding and mechanism design
approaches lead to the same destination.
Note that our goal is to show methods from mechanism design can be fruitfully applied to fun-
damental questions in neuroscience. We do not advocate specifically for the scoring rules described
below. These were derived from standard, but simple, neurophysiological models. With additional
work it should be possible to extend our results to more realistic models.
This work is inspired by a striking connections that has recently been discovered between market
scoring rules and no-regret learning [12], and related work suggesting that carefully designed markets
could be used to aggregate hypotheses generated by populations of learning algorithms [19, 27, 2].
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2. A minimal model
At first glance, the models developed by neuroscientists are quite different from the rational agents
studied in game theory. To build a bridge we utilize recent work discretizing a standard model from
the neuroscience literature [5].
2.1. Discretized neurons
Consider a system of N binary neurons {nj}Nj=1. Let O = {0, 1}N denote the set of possible states.
Each neuron is connected to a subset of the system. Suppose neuron nj has Kj  N synapses. We
model the restriction of the total system state to the subset received by neuron nj with a mask
projecting from {0, 1}N to {0, 1}Kj
ϕj : O → {0, 1}Kj : x = (x1, . . . , xN ) 7→ (xi){i|i→j}. (1)
Neuron nj is equipped with a Kj-vector of synaptic weights, wj ∈ Hj = RKj . Given input x ∈ O,
the neuron outputs a 0 or 1 according to
fwj (x) :=
{
1 if 〈wj , ϕj(x)〉 − ϑ > 0
0 else
(2)
for some fixed ϑ constant across all neurons.
To simplify the exposition, we drop ϕj from the notation and let H := RN denote the space of
synaptic weights – where synapses that do not physically exist are implicitly clamped to zero. Thus,
we treat entire system states as inputs to a neuron – when in fact the mask projects out most inputs.
Definition 1. Suppose we have utility function µ : O → R. Following [5], define reward function
R(x,wj , µj) = µj(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility
· (〈wj ,x〉 − ϑ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
margin
· fwj (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selectivity
(3)
Examples of utility functions are provided in §2.2 and §4.1.
Remark 1 (notation for spikes). Note that fwj (x), xj, 1wj , and 1j all denote the output of neuron
nj; emphasizing the function producing the output, that the output is also an input (one of many
forming a vector) to other neurons, or the indicator-function aspect of the output respectively. We use
1ij := 1i · 1j to indicate the cospiking of neurons ni and nj.
Ignoring costs for a moment, suppose neurons maximize E(x,µ)∼P
[
R(x,w, µ)
]
, where P (x, µ) is
the joint distribution on spiking inputs and neuromodulators.
The reward function is continuously differentiable (in fact, linear) as a function of w everywhere
except at the kink 〈w,x〉 = ϑ where it is continuous but not differentiable. We can therefore perform
gradient ascent to obtain synaptic updates
∆wij ∝ µj(x) · xi · fwj (x) = µj(x) · 1ij . (4)
In short, if nj receives input 1i and subsequently spikes 1j , then synapse i→ j is modified proportion-
ally to µj(x). The main theorem in [5] derives the above equations by discretizing standard models
of neuronal dynamics and learning:
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Theorem 1 (discretized neurons, [5]). The fast time constant limit of Gerstner’s Spike Response
Model [14] is (2). Taking the fast time constant limit of STDP [25] yields (4) with µj(x) = 1.
Finally, STDP is gradient ascent on a reward function whose limit is (3).
Spike-timing dependent plasticity is prone to overpotentiation [25], leading to epileptic seizures.
In the neuroscience literature, weights are typically controlled with a depotentation bias. We take an
alternative approach, by introducing a regularizer A•(w), which quantifies the resource costs incurred
by high synaptic weights [17, 5, 6].
The optimal weights are then computed according to
w∗j := argmax
w∈H
EP
[
S•(x; w)
]
(5)
:= argmax
w∈H
EP
[
R(x,w, µ)−A•(w)
]
(6)
where scoring rule S•(x,w) balances rewards R(x,w, µ) against costs A•(w). We consider two
standard regularizers taken from machine learning [24] and a third, more biologically plausible, taken
from [5]: 
A2(wj) =
1
2η‖wj‖22 `2
AH(wj) =
1
η
∑
i wij log wij `H
A1(wj) =
1
η‖wj‖1, where 0 ≤ wij ≤ 1 for all i. `1
Clearly `H is not a norm – we find the notation convenient.
Computing gradient ascent yields online updates
∆wij ∝ µj(x) · 1ij − 1
η
·

wij `2
log wij + 1 `H
1 `1
(7)
Remark 2 (regularizers). Each regularizer has points in its favor. The `1 regularizer provides a simple
interpretation of the saturated synaptic weights observed in some neurophysiological models [13]. The
`2 regularizer allows negative synaptic weights, corresponding to inhibitory synapses. Finally, `H
results in weights that can be interpreted as a probability distribution and is closely related to Hanson’s
logarithmic market scoring rule [11].
2.2. Utility functions
Three biologically inspired utility functions are:
Example U1. (Feedforward, frequency). Utility function µ(x) = 1 encourages neurons to spike for
inputs that are frequent and contain many spikes.
Example U2. (Feedforward, invariance). A more interesting utility function takes inputs over
consecutive time steps x = (x(t−1),x(t)) as input and sets µ(x) = fw(x(t−1)). This encourages neurons
to learn stable patterns containing many spikes, i.e. those that cause it to spike twice consecutively.
The utility function can be extended across multiple time steps, possibly with a temporal discount
factor.
Example U3. (Neuromodulators). Neuromodulatory systems signaling global rewards can be
modeled via P (ν|x) where ν is a real-valued random variable: positive outcomes are reinforced and
conversely. The utility is then µ(x) := Eν∼P (ν|x)[ν|x], where the expectation is with respect to the
distribution on neuromodulators.
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A fourth utility function is discussed in §4.1.
3. Neuronal prediction markets
Scoring rules are schemes for paying agents based on their reports. Proper scoring rules, which
incentivize agents to report truthfully, have proven useful in a wide range of settings including weather
forecasts [10], prediction markets [15, 18] and crowdsourced learning mechanisms [2, 3].
Our main result, Theorem 5, is that the scoring rules S• in (5) are proper for all three regularizers.
The upshot is that a neuron’s synaptic weights faithfully encode1 expectations about rewards after
pre- and post- synaptic spiking activity. The form of the encoding depends on the regularizer.
3.1. Synapses as rational agents
This subsection argues that synapses are analogous to traders, operating within a neuronal market,
that attempt to maximize their payout relative to their expenditures.
Prediction market traders buy and sell contingent securities. The simplest case is an Arrow-Debreu
security, which pays out $1 if an outcome belongs to a particular set, and $0 otherwise [4]. For example
an Arrow-Debreu security could pay $1 if and only if candidate X wins an election. The price a trader
will pay depends on her expectations about whether X will win. It turns out that the prices of
securities in well-designed, liquid markets reliably aggregate traders’ diverse, private information into
public estimates of the probabilities of outcomes [16].
nj neuron market
i→ j synapse trader
1i spike security
A•(wij) regularizer at i cost to i→ j
wij1i weight × spike 1is bought by i→ j
〈wj ,x〉 total current bundle of securities
〈wj ,x〉1j current × spike collective bid
µj(x)wij1ij reward of i→ j payout to i→ j
Since the neuronal scoring rule decomposes into sum S• =
∑
i Si•, we can model not only neurons,
but also synapses, as rational score-maximizing agents. Synapse i→ j receives payment
Si• := EP
[
(wij1i − ϑ) · µj(x)1j −A•(wij)
]
, (8)
where 1j depends on vector wj and couples the synapses.
Synapse i→ j invests amount A•(wij) to set its weight to wij . In return, it receives quantity wij
of security 1i.
Like paper money, the securities 1i have no intrinsic worth. Instead, they are bundled into total
current 〈wj ,x〉. If the bundle exceeds threshold ϑ then nj spikes. That is, nj uses the bundle to bid
on an extrinsic event: the utility µj(x).
After bidding, neuron nj receives payout µj(x)〈wj ,x〉1j , of which it distributes an amount µj(x)wij1ij
to each synapse proportional to its contribution wij1i to the bundle. Synapses only receive payouts
when they spike. Payouts can be positive or negative.
1“Truthful reporting” is not appropriate when referring to neurons. We use the phrase “faithful encoding” instead.
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Summarizing, synapses optimize the payout, µj(x)wij1ij resulting from their contribution wij1i
to the collective bid, against their cost A•(wij). The neuron’s bid 〈wj ,x〉1j is thus a collective
prediction of high utility by its synapses.
3.2. Proper scoring rules
The remainder of this section uses properness to precisely quantify how synaptic weights relate to
utility expectations.
Definition 2. Let PO be a set of probability distributions on states O and define a property as a
function Γ : PO → H. Scoring rule S : O ×H → R is proper [18] for property Γ : PO → H if for all
P ∈ PO
Γ(P ) ∈ argmax
w∈range(Γ)
EP
[
S(x; w)
]
. (9)
Properness is the common-sensical requirement that the true value, w = Γ(P ), is a score maxi-
mizer, w ∈ argmaxEP [S]. In short: “you get what you think you are paying for”.
Proper scoring rules can be constructed as follows [3]. Given functions ρ : O → H and F : H → R,
define
SF : O ×H → R : (x; w) 7→ −DF (ρ(x),w)− F (ρ(x))
where DF (x,y) := F (x)− F (y)− 〈∇F (y),x− y〉 is the Bregman divergence. It is shown in [3] that:
Proposition 2 (linear proper scoring rules).
If F is convex then SF is a proper scoring rule for linear property Γ : P 7→ EP [ρ(x)].
3.3. Proper scoring for discretized neurons
This section adapts Proposition 2 to discretized neurons. As a warmup, we show that dropping
the selectivity term from (3) yields proper scoring rules.
Lemma 3. Let T•(x; wj) := µj(x) ·
(〈wj ,x〉 − ϑ) − A•(wj) be scoring rules. These are proper for
ΓT• : PO → H = RN ,
ΓT• : P 7→ G•
(
EP
[
µj(x) · x
])
for

G2(v) = η · v
GH(v) = e
η·v−1
G1(v) = 1η·v>1,
where 1η·•>1 an N -vector of indicator functions returning 1 when η · • > 1 and 0 otherwise.
Proof. We drop ϑ since it is independent of wj . Define hypothesis space H = RN and map
ρµ : O → H : x 7→ µ(x) · x.
We consider the three cases in turn.
Observe that convex function F2(x) =
1
2η‖x‖22 yields scoring rule S2(x,wj) = 〈µ(x) · x,wj〉 −
1
2η‖wj‖22, which implies T2 is proper by Proposition 2.
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For TH , restrict H to the subset of RN where
∑
i exp(
1
ηwij)) = 1 and define ψ : H → H = RN
taking wij 7→ exp(
1
ηwij)∑
i exp(
1
ηwij))
= exp( 1ηwij). Convex function FH(x) = η log(
∑n
i=1 exp(
1
ηxi)) yields
SH(x,wj) = FH(wj) + 〈ψ(wj), µj(x) · x−wj〉
=
〈
ψ(wj), µj(x) · x
〉− 1
η
〈
ψ(wj), logψ(wj)
〉
,
since FH(wj) = 0. By Proposition 2 it follows that TH is proper for linear property EP [η · v]. The
result follows for ΓTH since e
•−1 is monotonic. We use the nonlinear “exp” representation since it
directly corresponds to synaptic weights which will be useful in Theorem 5.
Proposition 2 does not apply to T1, so we derive properness by other means. Computing gradients
obtains
∆wj ∝ EP
[
µj(x) · x
]− 1
η
which has a stationary point when all synaptic weights are equal to the scalar η. The stationary point
is unstable – a local minima rather than maxima. Synapses with EP [η · µj(x) · 1i] > 1 are forced
to boundary condition wij = 1; others are forced to 0 (for simplicity we assume no expectation is
precisely 1).
The range of ΓT1 is the set of N -vectors of 0s and 1s. Any w ∈ range(ΓT1 ) differing from ΓT1 (P )
has non-zero gradient and hence a lower score, implying ΓT1 is proper.
The selectivity term in (3) introduces a complication into the scoring rule: potentiating a synaptic
weight may cause a neuron to stumble over a sharp change in its utility function that is hidden by
the selectivity term. Although the reward function is continuous in w its derivative is not: there is a
kink. We bound the jump after crossing a kink via
Assumption 1 (no nasty surprises). If
∆ij = EP
[
µj(x)1i1wj
]− ∂iA•(wj) > 0 then there exists  > 0 such that
EP
[
µj(x)1·∆ij
]
> −∆ij ,
where 1∆ij := 1wj+·∆ij − 1wj .
Assumption 1 implies that sufficiently small synaptic updates, Eq. (7), always increase a neuron’s
score:
Lemma 4 (smooth ascent). Under Assumption 1, if ∆ij > 0 then there exists  > 0 such that
EP
[S•(x,wj +  ·∆ij)] > EP [S•(x,wj)]
and similarly for ∆ij < 0.
Proof. Straightforward computation.
Informally, if high utility follows ni and nj cospiking, then Assumption 1 says that the utility of
new inputs, causing nj to spike when synapse i increases by ∆ij , is not too negative. If the assumption
fails then the neuron will continuously potentiate and depotentiate synapse i as the gradient jumps
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from positive to negative. This is analogous to the behavior of a perceptron when confronted with
classes that are not linearly separable.
Nasty surprises can be avoided in at least two ways. First, by designing the utility function so that
it behaves well with respect to the distribution the neuron encounters. Second, by allowing neuron nj
to modify its regularization parameter ηj . Going further, one could introduce additional degrees of
freedom by associating an ηij with each synapse (note the regularizers are sums over synapses) that
is tweaked when a neuron detects that one of its synapses jumps back and forth. We do not pursue
these ideas here.
Before proving our main result, we introduce some notation. Given w, let 1w := f
−1
w (1) ⊂ O and
let 2O denote the powerset of O. Enlarge the hypothesis space to H′ := 2O × H with embedding
ψ : H → H′ : w 7→ (1w,w). Let w∗ = argmaxw∈H EP [S•].
Theorem 5 (neuronal scoring rules are proper). Under Assumption 1, scoring rules S• are proper
for property Γ• : P → H′ = 2O ×H,
Γ• : P 7→
(
1w∗ , G•
(
EP
[
µ(x) · x · 1w∗
]))
, (10)
where G•(v) ∈ {η · v, eη·v−1,1η·v>1} depending on the choice of regularizer.
Proof. Property P 7→ 1w∗ is proper by construction; we therefore focus on the synaptic term G•(·) in
Eq. (10).
Computing gradients for S2 and SH yields stationary points
w∗ = EP
[
η · µ(x) · x · 1w∗
]
and
w∗ ∝ exp
(
EP
[
η · µ(x) · x · 1w∗
]− 1)
respectively which are stable maxima under Assumption 1 by Lemma 4. As argued before, a weight
vector w that does not have zero-gradient cannot be a maxima, and the argument follows from
Lemma 3.
Similar reasoning applies to S1.
Remark 3 (indirect elicitation). Eliciting properties from distributions was studied in [18], which
drew a distinction between elicitable and directly elicitable properties. For example, the variance can
only be elicited by a scoring rule if the mean is elicited as well. Similarly, G•(EP [µ(x) ·1i1w∗ ]) cannot
be elicited directly, but only in conjunction with 1w∗ .
Neurons only modify their synapses to incorporate rewards when spiking, Eq. (4). This encourages
specialization, but also implies that individual neurons may never discover that spiking for certain
inputs results in very high utility. More formally, the kink makes S• non-convex, so gradient ascent
is not guaranteed to find the global optimum.
Nevertheless, the relationship between synaptic weights and expected utilities in Theorem 5 still
holds:
Corollary 6 (synaptic code). Let w˜ be the (in general local) maximum of S• obtained by gradient
ascent with Eq. (7). If Assumption 1 holds then w˜ satisfies
w˜ = G•
(
EP
[
µ(x) · x · 1w˜
])
. (11)
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Note that Eq. (11) is not in closed form since w˜ appears on both the left- and right-hand sides.
Proof. Since local maxima are stationary points, the proof follows the same argument as Theorem 5.
A discretized neuron nj thus faithfully encodes two properties of its input distribution. First, its
spikes encode a set of inputs for which spiking is locally optimal. Second, its synaptic weights encode
the expected utility per synapse when ni and nj co-spike.
Remark 4 (neural code). Corollary 6 provides an interesting interpretation of the meaning of spikes.
A neuron spikes if the dot product 〈wj ,x〉 is above threshold ϑ. That is, neuron nj’s spike means
that the current system state x is significant (above threshold) when evaluated against the utility
expectations wj that were previously encoded into nj’s structure.
Similarly to how stock price movements encode information about which sectors of an economy
are expected to yield high profits in the near future; spikes and synaptic weights encode expectations
about future rewards.
4. Cortical prediction markets
This section investigates how neurons can estimate their usefulness to downstream neurons, and
so allocate their resources such that the benefit to other neurons is maximized. In short, we introduce
a utility function that incentivizes neurons to optimize their usefulness to other neurons.
4.1. Backpropagation: errors or incentives?
To provide context, we recall related work on incorporating spikes into a reward signal. Neuro-
modulators provide a primary reward system. However, neurons whose actions do not directly result
in pleasure or pain may require more indirect incentives. In machine learning, multilayer networks
are often trained by backpropagating errors [23]. However, backpropagation (BP) is biologically im-
plausible – it requires pathways for backpropagating errors which have not been observed in cortex
[22].
As an alternative, [22] proposed attention-gated reinforcement learning (AGREL), which uses
feedback spikes as attention signals to modulate learning. AGREL abstracts two features of feedback
(NMDA) connections in cortex: (i) they prolong, but do not initiate, spiking activity and (ii) they
have a multiplicative effect on synaptic updates.
ni
wffij // nj
wjk
44 nk
wfbkj
uu
AGREL updates feedforward weights according to
∆wij ∝ wfbkjxk · xixj · (1− xj) · f(δ), (12)
where f(δ) is a global reward signal. Here, neurons have real-valued outputs and (1−xj) is a regularizer
that prevents nj from overactivating. The main result of [22] is that average weight changes E
[
∆wij
]
under (12) coincide with BP. AGREL thus provides a biologically plausible substitute for BP.
Inspired by AGREL, we introduce a 4th utility function:
9
Example U4. (Feedback). Identify disjoint upstream and downstream populations, xff and xfb
respectively, and define Hff and Hfb by clamping weights not in the respective populations to zero
using Eq (1). Define the feedback utility as µfbj (x) := 〈wfbj ,x〉 for wfbj ∈ Hfb.
A neuron with feedback utility maximizes
EP
[
〈wfbj ,x〉
(〈wffj ,x〉 − ϑ)1j −A•(wj)] (13)
and so aligns its feedforward 〈wffj ,x〉 and feedback 〈wfbj ,x〉 current whenever the neuron itself spikes.
Computing gradient ascent on scoring rule Sfb• (w; x) = 〈wfb,x〉·(〈wff ,x〉−ϑ)·1j−A•(w) obtains
∆wffij ∝ 〈wfbj ,x〉 · 1ij − ∂iA•(w), (14)
which differs from AGREL (12) by using ∂iA• as regularizer instead of (1−xj) and extending feedback
from a single neuron, wfbkjxk, to many neurons, 〈wfbj ,x〉. We also drop the global reward signal f(δ)
since we are interested in the pure backpropagation case; it can easily be reinstated.
Note that the utility function µfb is itself plastic. Neuron nj not only modifies feedforward weights
to maximize its score, it also modifies feedback weights to increase the maximum achievable score:
∆wfbkj ∝ (〈wffj ,x〉 − ϑ) · 1jk − ∂kA•(w). (15)
4.2. Estimating usefulness with feedback
As suggested in the introduction, one way to encourage collaboration is for each neuron to estimate
its usefulness to the rest of the system and optimize that estimate. By Corollary 6, a faithful measure
of the usefulness of nj ’s output to the rest of cortex is the sum of active downstream synaptic weights:
Definition 3. The usefulness Vj(x) of a spike by nj is the sum of the synaptic weights of downstream
neurons that co-spike with nj:
Vj(x) :=
∑
{k | j→k}
wjk1jk = 〈wj•,x〉1j . (16)
Intuitively, Vj(x) is the total utility that spiking downstream neurons expect after nj spikes.
Neurons cannot compute their usefulness directly, since the utilities of downstream neurons are
private. They must therefore make do with publicly available data: spikes by other neurons. We there-
fore propose that neurons use feedback, which they can actually compute, as a proxy for usefulness,
which would be ideal.
As a consequence of Corollary 6, we quantify how closely feedback-utility approximates usefulness
(16):
Corollary 7 (estimating usefulness with feedback). Neuron nj equipped with utility function µ
fb(x)
approximately maximizes its usefulness V(nj) to the rest of cortex, where the failure of the approxi-
mation is
∑
k
1jk

usefulness︷ ︸︸ ︷
G•
(
E
[
µk(x)1jk
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wjk
−
approximation︷ ︸︸ ︷
G•
(
E
[〈wffj ,x〉1jk])︸ ︷︷ ︸
wfbkj
 .
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Thus, the quality of 〈wfbj ,x〉 as an estimate of Vj(x) depends on how closely nj ’s feedforward
inputs 〈wffj ,x〉 approximate the sum of the downstream utilities µk(x).
Proof. The usefulness and utility of nj are
Vj(x) = 〈wj•,x〉1j and µfbj (x) = 〈wfb•j ,x〉 respectively.
The utility µfbj is multiplied by 1j when it is used in scoring rules, so the difference comes down to
the weights. Corollary 6 implies the optimal feedforward weights are
wjk = G•
(
EP
[
µk(x) · 1jk
])
so that the usefulness of nj is
Vj(x) =
∑
{k | j→k}
1jk ·G•
(
EP
[
µk(x)1jk
])
.
Again by Corollary 6, the properness of the scoring function implies the optimal weights for k → j
satisfy
wfbkj = G•
(
EP
[〈wff ,x〉1jk])
and we are done.
Experiments in §5 demonstrate that wfbkj is a good proxy for wjk in some interesting cases.
A detailed analysis of the relationship between approximations wjk ≈ wfbkj , distribution P (x), and
utility functions µk(x) is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.3. Neurons as rational agents
Section §3.1 suggested neurons are analogous to markets in which synapses trade. This section
presents a second analogy, where cortex forms a market in which neurons trade.
Recall that neurons are rational agents that optimize their expected reward balanced against a
cost term, Theorem 1:
w∗j := argmax
wj∈H
EP
[(〈wj ,x〉 − ϑ) · µj(x)1j −A•(wj)].
The key idea is that each neuron should optimize its usefulness to the rest of the brain. Building
on Corollary 6, usefulness is defined as Vj(x) =
∑
j→k wjk1jk. That is, the quantity of 1j used by
downstream neurons in their internal markets. Unfortunately, nj does not have access to this number.
Similarly to how musicians are paid for actual sales rather than downloads of their music, neurons
need to record when their outputs are used. They therefore use feedback to compute 〈wfb•j ,x〉1j ,
which acts as a proxy2 for 〈wfb•j ,x〉1j .
2Recorded usage could over- or under- estimate true usage. Section §5 shows that it is a good guide in practice.
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Figure 1: Foveator and Tracker architectures. Arrows are initialized randomly. Red arrows are plastic;
black are fixed.
nj neuron trader
〈wff•j ,x〉1j ff current × spike purchases by nj
〈wj•,x〉1j usefulness Vj(x) of nj use made of nj
〈wfb•j ,x〉1j fb current × spike recorded usage
= payment to nj
Intuitively, nj simultaneously sets its feedback connections on the downstream traders that most
frequently purchase its spikes, and sets its feedforward connections on the upstream traders that sell
the most useful spikes.
The result is a mesh of intertwining neuronal chains – optimized for usefulness at every link by
the invisible hand of the cortical market – that connects sensory inputs to motor actions.
5. Experiments
We investigate the empirical performance of discretized neurons. The experiments are designed to
show that: (i) the ideas above can be implemented with minimal modifications; (ii) synaptic weights
encode environmental statistics and rewards; (iii) feedback improves performance; and (iv) feedback
reliably estimates a neuron’s usefulness.
We have therefore constructed networks, inspired by [21], that learn tasks designed so that the
embedding of expected utilities into synaptic weights is easy to visualize.
Our goal is not to compete with the state of the art. Rather, our aim is to introduce mecha-
nism design techniques into the analysis and construction of networks. A pressing open question is
whether more sophisticated networks, such as those developed by the deep learning community, can
be understood or improved via mechanism design.
Network architectures. The tracker network, Fig. 1 left, has a sensory grid S of 20 × 20 neurons,
intermediate layers V and D with 100 neurons each, motor layer M , and 100 randomly connected
inhibitory neurons INH. Signals from S to D are delayed so that V and D receive different temporal
snapshots of S. Synapses are plastic except those to or from inhibitory neurons. M is divided into 8
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(a) Synapses on paths through subsystem V
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(b) Synapses on paths through subsystem D
Figure 2: Average synaptic weights in Tracker network.
areas of 10 neurons each. Actuators engage when they receive more than 10 spikes. The network is
initialized randomly.
The tracker network tracks targets traveling along an edge of the visual field. Motor areas are
rewarded (µj = +1) or punished (µj = −1) according to whether or not the action correctly anticipates
where the target is headed and from which direction (4×2 possibilities). Note the motor layer receives
neuromodulatory signals whereas the intermediary layers do not and learn from feedback.
The foveator network, Fig. 1 right, drops D and has fewer inhibitory neurons.
The foveation task is to move the fovea (center of the retina) onto an object appearing on the edge
of the visual field. Each motor area controls an actuator that moves the fovea in a compass direction
(N, NW, W, etc). After a movement, the corresponding area is rewarded (µj = 1) if the object is
closer to the center and punished (−1) otherwise.
We tweak the discretized neuron in §2 to make the dynamics closer to continuous time models of
cortical neurons.
First, we introduce a voltage term V , which provides neurons with a steadily decaying “memory”
of previously received spikes. Neurons spike when V > ϑ, after which V ← 0. When the neuron does
not spike, V is updated according to
V ← V + 〈w,x〉 − δ.
Neurons maintain an exponentially decaying trace reflecting recent output spikes:
tracej ← 0.95 ·
(
tracej + 0.4 · 1j
)
Neurons in subsystems V and D update their feedforward synapses according to
∆wij ∝ 〈wfb,x〉 · 1i · tracej
and similarly for feedback. Thus, tracej is substituted for 1j to temporally smooth out learning.
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Neurons in subsystem M update their synapses according to
∆wij ∝ µj(x) ·
t∑
t′=t−m
1ij
where the sum is over tics since the last neuromodulatory signal, similar to the trace implemented in
V and D.
Finally, we tweak the regularization. Instead of continually regularizing by A1(w), we regularize
at discrete intervals, analogous to a hypothesized role of sleep [5]. Regularization consists of setting
the K strongest synapses to 1, and pruning the rest (i.e. setting their weights to 0). The number K
is fixed within each layer, but varies across layers.
Visualizing synaptic strengths. By Corollary 7, the quality of a neuron’s usefulness-estimate can be
computed and visualized by comparing average feedforward and feedback weights.
Weights are visualized in Fig 2 and 3 as follows. For each area in M , we average over all feedforward
paths S → V →M and feedback paths S → V ←M respectively, and similarly for D. To save space,
3 out of 8 areas in M are plotted. Plots are averaged over 20 runs. Blue denotes low values; red
denotes high.
Results. (i) The tasks are easy and the networks rapidly (within a few thousand tics) achieve 98%
and 95% accuracy. The tracker outperforms the foveator, possibly because the foveator modifies its
environment by actively moving the center of the retina, whereas the tracker does not.
The delay line is essential to tracker performance: if the delay is set to zero then the network
performs little better than chance, and the structure of the environment is not learned at all.
Tracker % correct # correct
only M plastic 95 243
all plastic 98 672
Foveator
only M plastic 93 80
all plastic 95 207
(ii) The middle rows of Fig 2 and 3 show how rewards and environmental statistics are incorporated
into the networks’ feedforward structure.
For the tracker network, the V -area synapses learn trajectories; whereas the D-area learns the
starting points of trajectories. The combination of instantaneous lines in V (which learn directions)
and delay lines in D (which learn starting points) thus allows the network to implicitly compute
derivatives and thereby determine directions of travel.
For the foveator, it is easy to read off the correspondence between the NE, N, and NW movements
of the actuators and the locations of objects driving the movements.
(iii) Shutting off feedback plasticity (top rows of Fig 2 and 3) slightly worsens performance, from
98% to 95% for the tracker and from 95% to 93% for the foveator. However, it dramatically worsens
the “reaction times” of the networks, quantified as the number of times the actuators correctly engage
per 1000 tics.
Indeed, looking at synaptic weights without feedback plasticity, top rows of the figures, we find
that the structure of the rewards and environment is barely visible.
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Figure 3: Average weights in Foveator network.
(iv) Finally, when feedback plasticity is turned on, average synaptic weights over feedforward
paths T → V/D → M (middle rows) and feedback paths T → V/D ← M (bottom rows) are almost
identical, demonstrating that neurons in V and D accurately estimate their usefulness to downstream
M neurons using feedback.
6. Conclusion
This paper applied tools from mechanism design to investigate a simple model of cortical neurons.
The main result is that, under a technical assumption, neurons faithfully encode expected utilities
into their synaptic weights. If the result can be extended to more realistic models, then it will provide
a powerful new approach to understanding the relationship between cortical structure and function.
There is good reason to be optimistic: extending the analysis to continuous time models requires
exponential discount factors analogous to interest rates – which are well-understood in mechanism
design.
An important corollary of the analysis is a novel interpretation of the role of spiking feedback in
cortex: neurons can use feedback spikes to estimate their usefulness to the rest of cortex, and then
learn to maximize that estimate.
We have used the the simplest possible scoring rules, derived from standard models of neurons,
to provide a proof of principle. It will be interesting to explore more realistic models taken from
the neuroscience literature, and also more powerful models such as those developed for deep neural
networks.
Finally, although the flow of ideas in this paper is one-sided – from mechanism design to neuronal
models – we expect that future work will be more symmetric. The cortex aggregates information far
more effectively than the auctions and online markets studied in game theory. This suggests there are
powerful design principles waiting to be uncovered.
Acknowledgements. I am grateful to Hastagiri Vanchinathan for encouraging me to look into
mechanism design.
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